DNS rebinding flaw lets websites drive Todoist MCP server
A GitHub advisory published on 19 November 2026 says any public web page can run tools on a locally hosted Todoist MCP server and change a user's tasks.
By The Agentic Times ·

A security advisory published on 19 November 2026 describes a DNS rebinding vulnerability in the Todoist MCP server, made by Doist, that lets an ordinary website read, write and delete a victim's Todoist data without supplying any credentials. The flaw is tracked as CVE-2026-76807 and affects the npm package @doist/todoist-mcp at version 10.3.1, specifically when the optional Streamable HTTP server, todoist-mcp-http, is running.
According to the advisory, the HTTP server binds to the loopback address 127.0.0.1 by default and accepts requests from browsers without checking the Host or Origin headers that identify where a request came from. DNS rebinding is a technique in which an attacker's domain is made to resolve to the victim's own machine, so the browser connects to a local service while still believing it is talking to the attacker's site. Because the headers are preserved and the local server never validates them, the attacker's page can post MCP requests to the /mcp endpoint.
The advisory says the server's middleware checks only the operator's own Todoist token, which is configured through the TODOIST_API_KEY environment variable, and does not authenticate the browser making the call. Every tool then runs with the operator's token. The researcher's write-up calls this a violation of the browser-origin boundary, noting that a user may deliberately bind the server to loopback only and still be reachable from an unrelated public website.
A proof of concept included in the advisory shows the attack working against the upstream code at commit d2903e0d. A rebound browser session enumerated the available tools, called user-info and received details of the Todoist account tied to the server-held key, then created a task labelled as an attacker-created demo and completed it. The advisory states the MCP response returned a success count and the Todoist interface showed the task as completed. A demo video accompanies the report.
The demonstrated impact is limited to creating and completing tasks, but the advisory says the same path exposes the rest of the registered write surface. That includes updating and rescheduling tasks, changing projects and sections, and altering comments, reminders, filters, labels, goals and assignments, as well as deleting objects. The stdio entry point, which is not reachable from a browser, is not affected.
The advisory recommends strict Host validation before MCP requests are dispatched, accepting only explicit loopback names and operator-configured trusted hostnames, and rejecting requests with missing or untrusted Origin values. It also advises requiring a per-run bearer token or similar caller secret even for loopback deployments, noting that header checks reduce DNS rebinding exposure but are not caller authentication, and suggests enabling the DNS rebinding protection available in the MCP SDK HTTP transport. The incident record lists the issue as reported.
Sources
- github.comhttps://github.com/advisories/GHSA-833v-v58w-294h
