Friday, 20 November 2026
2 agent hacks today▼ 9 vs yesterday (11)

Any website could rewrite your Obsidian vault via MCP flaw

A missing Host and Origin check in obsidian-sync-mcp let a visited web page read, overwrite and delete notes without credentials, the advisory says.

By The Agentic Times ·

A web spider crawls through an open door into a library, silently rewriting every book on the shelves while the librarian sleeps, leaving no trace of entry.
A web spider crawls through an open door into a library, silently rewriting every book on the shelves while the librarian sleeps, leaving no trace of entry. · Illustration: The Agentic Times

A security advisory published on 19 November 2026 says that obsidian-sync-mcp, a server that connects AI tools to an Obsidian note vault through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), could be driven by any website an operator visited. The flaw, tracked as CVE-2026-77283, affects versions up to and including 0.5.6 when the server runs without an authentication token. Version 0.5.7 contains the fix.

According to the advisory, the HTTP MCP endpoint did not validate the Host or Origin header before dispatching MCP methods. That breaks the assumption behind the project's documented "no-auth" mode, which is intended for local use only. A malicious page can use DNS rebinding, a technique in which an attacker-controlled hostname is made to resolve to the victim's own machine, to issue requests that the server treats as trusted local calls.

The advisory says that gave attackers the full tool surface: read_note, write_note, edit_note, delete_note, move_note, list_notes, list_folders, list_tags and get_note_metadata. In practice, the advisory states, a page's JavaScript could silently read an entire vault and create, overwrite, delete or move notes, with no credentials and no prompt to the user.

The exposure is not limited to unusual configurations. The advisory notes that the README's "Filesystem mode (simplest)" quickstart and the self-hosted docker-compose setup both run without MCP_AUTH_TOKEN, because the Docker environment defaults the token to empty. Deployments using CouchDB or Self-hosted LiveSync go through the same code path, so vault content held in CouchDB is equally reachable. Deployments that set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN are not affected, because browsers do not attach a bearer token and a forged request returns HTTP 401.

The advisory describes two browser-reachable variants. The first is classic DNS rebinding, where the browser sends the attacker's hostname in the Host header. The second needs no rebinding at all: a page can fetch the loopback address directly, so the Host header is genuinely 127.0.0.1, while the Origin header is attacker-controlled. Because the transport sends a wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin header, the response would be exposed to the attacking page.

On root cause, the advisory says that in no-auth mode the server's authenticate option was never installed, so the FastMCP framework dispatched every request without a per-request check. Even with a token configured, only the Authorization header was inspected. Nothing in the server, in fastmcp, or in mcp-proxy validated Host or Origin.

Version 0.5.7 adds an application-layer check in authenticate. Requests whose Host is not localhost, 127.0.0.1 or ::1, or not listed in a new MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS setting, are rejected before any MCP method runs, as are requests carrying a cross-origin Origin outside that allowlist. The Host check defeats rebinding; the Origin check defeats the direct loopback fetch. The advisory describes this as a compensating control that does not change the wildcard CORS header itself, because the rejection happens before any response body is produced. Non-browser MCP clients send no Origin header and are unaffected.

The advisory is clear about the limits of the fix. The new checks block browser-delivered attacks only; a non-browser network client can still forge both headers. On untrusted networks, the advisory says, operators should set MCP_AUTH_TOKEN. Setting that token also works as an immediate workaround on any version.

Sources

  1. github.comhttps://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mx6p-3fg7-v6pj