Two flaws disclosed in Okta's Hyperdrive agent plugin

Two vulnerabilities in Okta's Hyperdrive agent plugin were published as GitHub security advisories on 8 September 2026. One concerns how the plugin reports the outcome of an authentication check. The other concerns what the agent writes to disk after a successful multi-factor authentication. Both affect the Okta Hyperdrive agent plugin, according to the advisories.

The first issue is tracked as CVE-2026-78629. According to the advisory, the Hyperdrive agent plugin returns a success response without a signed SAML assertion when the organisation's policy requires no MFA for a given user. SAML is the standard used to pass identity claims between an identity provider and an application that relies on it, and the signature is what lets the receiving application check that the claim is genuine.

In that no-MFA case, the advisory says, the response contains only a bare boolean validation indicator, with no cryptographic artifact attached. The result, in the advisory's words, is an unverifiable authentication verdict being delivered to the relying application. In other words, the application receives a plain yes without anything it can independently check.

The second issue is tracked as CVE-2026-78631. The advisory states that the Okta Hyperdrive Agent writes the decoded SAML bearer assertion to a local application log file at the default log level, and that it does so on every successful MFA completion. A bearer assertion is a credential that grants access to whoever presents it, without further proof of identity.

Because the writing happens at the default log level, no unusual debugging configuration is needed to trigger it. The advisory describes this as an insertion of sensitive information into the log file, and says the effect is to make a live authentication credential readable by any local user with access to that log file.

The two advisories were published at the same time and describe different stages of the same authentication flow. The first affects users who are not required to complete MFA under their organisation's policy. The second affects users who do complete MFA, since the logging is described as occurring on every successful completion.

The advisories as published do not list affected package versions, and neither advisory names a fixed release. They do not state who reported the issues, whether the flaws have been exploited, or what mitigations administrators should apply in the meantime. The Agentic Times has not seen a separate statement from Okta on either issue.

For organisations running the plugin, the practical questions raised by the advisory text are which users fall under a no-MFA policy, and who can read the agent's local log files on the hosts where it runs. Both are configuration questions rather than code questions, though the behaviour described in each advisory is the agent's own default.

This is a developing record. Further detail, including affected versions and any patch, would normally be added to the GitHub advisory entries for CVE-2026-78629 and CVE-2026-78631 as it becomes available.